Abstract. We design communication efficient two-party and multi-party protocols for the longest common subsequence (LCS) and related problems. Our protocols achieve privacy with respect to passive adversaries, under reasonable cryptographic assumptions. We benefit from the somewhat surprising interplay of an efficient block-retrieval PIR (GentryRamzan, ICALP 2005) with the classic "four Russians" algorithmic design. This result is the first improvement to the communication complexity for this application over generic results (such as Yao's garbled circuit protocol) and, as such, is interesting as a contribution to the theory of communication efficiency for secure two-party and multiparty applications.
Introduction
We design communication efficient two-party and multi-party protocols for two variants of the longest common subsequence (LCS) problem, and related problems. The first variant returns only the length of the LCS, while the second outputs the string encoding the subsequence itself. Previous work on this topic [25, 34, 10] has focused on implementing basic dynamic programming algorithms privately, using techniques that each achieve O(n 2 ) communication complexity (where n is the length of each input string). Jha, Kruger, and Shmatikov [25] demonstrate that some of these solutions may be practically quite efficient. This previous work, however, does not improve on the asymptotic communication complexity of generic solutions such as Yao's garbled circuit protocol [36] . Thus, our work is both theoretically and practically interesting since it can be interpreted as a new upper bound on the communication complexity of this problem.
Traditionally, the method known as the "four Russians" technique yields only a logarithmic improvement in the running time of the dynamic programming solution for LCS. Somewhat surprisingly, we show This is the full version of an article [18] to appear in CT- RSA 2009. how to take advantage of an efficient block-retrieval PIR due to Gentry and Ramzan [21] and use the "four Russians" technique to obtain a communication efficient private protocol for the LCS problem. Specifically, we design protocols that achieve O(n 2 /t) total communication cost, for any positive t < n.
In our protocol, the computational cost of one party increases (anywhere between linearly and exponentially, depending on the choice of parameter t), while the remaining parties' computation costs reduce to O(n 2 /t). In the most practical setting, where each party performs only a polynomial amount of computation, we achieve a new, sub-quadratic upper bound for the private protocol's communication complexity.
If some participant can perform more work, our protocol becomes even more communication efficient. This setting, where an asymmetric work load yields communication savings for all participants, may be quite advantageous. This client-server setting may even be realistic, given the large volume of genomic data held by central entities. We also show how to outsource the work needed by our protocol to a set of powerful, dedicated yet untrusted servers.
Motivation: Performing different computational tasks on large biological databases is becoming a more common practice in both public and private institutions. The FBI maintains a database of over four million DNA profiles of criminal offenders, crime scene evidence, and missing persons in its CODIS system [2] , and uses the data for forensic studies and DNA-based identification. deCODE Genetics [3], a biopharmaceutical company which studies genomic data for drug discovery and development, has collected the genotypic and medical data of over 50 percent of the population in Iceland. Similar endeavors seek to make these types of databases available for scientific study [5] .
The genomic data stored in these databases may be extremely sensitive: an individual's DNA sequence reveals a great deal of information regarding that individual's health, background, and physical appearance [1, 4] . It has been shown that a sequence can be linked to the corresponding individual simply by recognizing the presence of certain markers [27] . Protecting a patient's privacy when working with genomic data is recognized as a major challenge for the biomedical research community [8, 35] . Furthermore, in the United States, HIPAA's Privacy Rule [32] mandates that a patient's identity must be protected when their data (including genomic data) is shared; failure to assure this may result in legal action, fines, revocation of government funding, and imprisonment.
The pioneering work of Jha, Kruger, and Shamtikov [25] and others [34, 10] has recognized the need for private and efficient computation on genomic data in general, and the LCS and edit distance problems in particular. We hope our results continue to motivate improvements to the state-of-the-art in this domain.
Related Work
It is possible to use generic solutions or pre-existing protocols to solve the problems considered in this paper. However, we desire protocols that are efficient in terms of communication complexity (the total number of bits sent and received by the participants in the protocol).
While the theoretical lower bound 1 for the running time of an algorithm that solves the LCS problem for two strings of length n is Ω(|Σ|n) for a fixed alphabet Σ [6] , the theoretically fastest known algorithm solving this problem is that of Masek and Patterson [28] , achieving O(n 2 / log n). The circuit simulating this algorithm, however, is of size O(n 2 ). Thus, generic compilers like Yao's garbled circuit protocol [36] would yield communication complexity O(n 2 ). Naor and Nissim's communication preserving compiler [30] may yield a protocol with O(n) communication complexity, but the protocol would require on-line work that is exponential in n.
We can reduce the LCS problem to the shortest path problem, and then use secure matrix multiplication protocols, e.g. [26] , or secure graph protocols [11] to recover a solution. The reduction, however, increases the input size of the problem, so that instead of an input of size Θ(n), we now must consider a graph or matrix of size Θ(n 2 ). Even assuming we have access to private protocols for matrix multiplication or shortest path with optimal communication efficiency, using this reduction will yield a protocol with Ω(n 2 ) communication complexity.
We could also re-use secure protocols implementing the NeedlemanWunsch algorithm (or a variation of it, the Smith-Waterman algorithm) [10, 34, 25] . These algorithms solve a generalization of the edit distance problem, where insertions and deletions have variable costs. When all costs are 1, these algorithms can be used to directly solve the problems we consider here. Szajda, Pohl, Owen, and Lawson [34] provide a heuristic protocol for Smith-Waterman attaining heuristic security, which fails to meet the correctness or privacy needs considered here. Atallah, Kerschbaum, and Du [10] and Jha, Kruger, and Shmatikov [25] provide protocols whose communication complexities are O(n 2 ), meeting but not improving upon the asymptotic efficiency of the generic solution, using Yao's garbled circuit protocol.
Notations and Definitions
Notation Ω(f ) denotes that the asymptotic lower bound f is tight; Θ(f ), means that f is both a lower bound and an upperbound, and O(f ) denotes the asymptotic upper bound O(f ), ignoring polylog(f ) factors.
Sharing Values
We take advantage of two simple sharing schemes, XOR sharing and additive sharing, in our protocols. Alice and Bob XOR share a value c, if Alice holds the value a and Bob holds the value b, such that a ⊕ b = c. Similarly, an integer c is additively shared between the parties if a + b mod N = c, where N is a properly chosen and publicly known integer.
Security We prove our protocols secure against a passive adversary (also referred to as semi-honest) who follows the steps of the protocol but tries to learn additional information based on the messages he receives throughout the protocol. The security in this model is defined by requiring that any adversary in the real protocol, can be simulated by an adversary in an ideal world where parties send their inputs to a trusted party who computes and sends back their corresponding outputs. For a more formal definition, we refer the reader to [22, Volume 2] . Central to our security claims is the following composition theorem.
Theorem 1 (Composition for Passive Adversaries [22] ). Suppose that g is privately reducible to f and that there exists a protocol for privately computing f . Then, there exists a protocol for privately computing g.
Using the above theorem, along with simple hybrid arguments, it is straight-forward to prove our protocols private against a passive adversary as long as our subprotocols are private.
Longest Common Subsequence
Let A and B be two strings over a fixed alphabet Σ of size σ, with lengths m = |A| and n = |B| (without loss of generality, let m ≤ n). A subsequence of A is a string X such that A can be transformed into X by deleting characters from A. A longest common subsequence (LCS) of A and B is a subsequence of both A and B such that no other common subsequence has greater length.
Algorithms that solve the longest common subsequence problem return one or more of the following outputs:
1. The length of the LCS of A and B. 2. A string which is a LCS of A and B.
3. An embedding α, β of a LCS of A and B
Where an embedding α ∈ {0, 1} m and β ∈ {0, 1} n are bit-strings which select an LCS from A and B, respectively.
LCS algorithm using standard dynamic programming techniques
The following dynamic programming algorithm solving the longest common subsequence problem was independently discovered by many researchers, in both computer science and biology. For a standard presentation of this type of dynamic programming solution, see [14,
Let L be the (m + 1) × (n + 1) matrix whose entries can be computed (row-by-row or column-by-column) using the following:
Entry L[m, n] holds the length of the LCS for A and B, and simple deterministic backtracking algorithms exist for recovering the value and/or the embedding of an LCS for A and B.
LCS algorithm using the "four Russians" technique
Masek and Patterson [28] give a variant on this dynamic programming solution for the LCS problem, using ideas (colloquially known as the "four Russians" technique) introduced by Arlazarov, Dinic, Kronod and Faradzev [9] for boolean matrix multiplication.
Let t be a positive integer. Then, the boundaries of the t × t block of the dynamic programming table L starting at position (i, j) can be denoted with the following variables (see Figure 1) .
Let the offset vectors I 1 (i, j), I 2 (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} t be defined as
It is simple to check that consecutive values in the L matrix increase by at most one, so the offsets are indeed bit-vectors.
The basic observation underlying the four Russians technique is that the values E(i, j) and S(i, j) are completely determined by j) ). Thus, we can compute the entire dynamic programming table in the following manner:
1. Pre-processing: pre-compute all possible t × t blocks, by considering all possible t-length strings and offset vectors, but assume the first value of the block is 0. That is, generate a table summarizing bbf(·, ·, ·, ·, 0). Note that bbf(·, ·, ·, ·, 0) + C = bbf(·, ·, ·, ·, C); i.e., if the first value of the block is C and not zero, the pre-computed outputs differ from the desired outputs in every place by the additive term C. 
) by looking up the appropriate pre-computed block. Any L[i , j ] entry situated on the boundary of this block can be calculated by adding L[i, j] to the appropriate value from the retrieved E(i, j) or S(i, j) vectors. Iterate in this fashion, using S(i, j), E(i, j) to determine I 1 (i + t, j), I 2 (i, j + t), each time considering the first value of the block to be 0 during look-up and then compensating by adding back the appropriate additive term.
Essentially, we have reduced our m×n matrix to an m/t×n/t matrix. In the unit-cost RAM model, partially filling out the L matrix in this fashion takes O(mn/t 2 ) time.
Communication Efficient Protocols for Private LCS
Here, we build a private protocol for determining the length of the LCS. Later, we provide a deterministic backtracking algorithm for privately recovering an actual LCS or LCS embedding.
Definition 1 (Private LCS-length).
A protocol is a private LCS-length protocol between two parties (one holding a private input string A, the other holding a private input string B) if the protocol outputs the length of the LCS of A and B, but reveals no information to a passive adversary other than what she can learn from the output.
Below we provide details describing a private LCS-length protocol. At a high-level, the protocol executes the algorithm of Masek and Patterson described earlier, but each party holds shares of the L matrix. Basic block function table look-ups are performed using a communication efficient private block retrieval scheme, while the remaining computations are designed to be performed by the parties locally.
Private block retrieval (PBR) was first introduced in the original PIR paper of Chor et al. [13] . A PBR scheme is essentially a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme that allows the chooser to retrieve -bit database entries, as opposed to bit entries. We call such a scheme a symmetric PBR (SPBR) scheme if it also provides privacy for the server (database).
Any secure two-party PBR schemes can be transformed into an SPBR scheme that provides this functionality, via the Naor-Pinkas transform [31] , the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold transform [7] , or zero-knowledge proofs. We note that, excluding zero-knowledge based techniques, these transforms incur no loss of efficiency for the SPBR. 
. The resulting index x 1 ||x 2 ||x 3 ||x 4 is a bit-string of length 2 log(σ)t + 2t. At this index, Alice stores the following: -E(i, j), S(i, j).
-The offset vectors I 1 (i+t, j), I 2 (i, j+t) associated with E(i, j), S(i, j). Clearly these two vector pairs are redundant because given either pair we can compute the other, but as each is shared using a different sharing scheme, holding both will make local computations easier, later. Because the first entry of the pre-computed block is set to zero, the values of E(i, j), S(i, j) will always be in the interval [0, t]. This means each entry of our look-up table will be a bit-string of length 2t + 2t log t. 2. Accessing the basic block function: From previous database accesses, Alice and Bob will hold XOR shares of I 1 (i + t, j) = x 3 and I 2 (i+t, j) = x 4 . In all cases, x 1 is known only to Alice and x 2 is known only to Bob. Thus, Alice can simply consider her share of x 2 to be 0 t log σ , and similarly for Bob. This allows Alice and Bob to locally concatenate their values, producing valid XOR shares of the next index x 1 ||x 2 ||x 3 ||x 4 . The database defining the basic block function is accessed each time in the following way: (a) Alice picks some random value and locally blinds each of her database's entries by this value. Particularly, XORing by a random string is used for each offset vector, and adding a random value is used for each E(i, j) and S(i, j). Theorem 2. The above protocol is a private LCS-length protocol for inputs of length n and m, assuming we have a secure SPBR scheme for a database of N entries each of size .
Proof. (sketch) The above security claim follows from the security of the share conversion protocols, our black-box use of SPBR, and from general composition theorems [12, 22] . How to specify the parameters N and to attain the efficiency we desire is explained in the complexity analysis, below.
Analysis
Theorem 3. Assume we have an SBR scheme such that: (1) for a database of size N , on query i the scheme returns the i-th -bit entry of the database for integer parameter with 2 < N , and (2) the scheme has g(N, ) = O(log N ) communication complexity and requires f (N, ) = O(N ) work. Then the described protocol for LCS-length has the following complexities, as a function of the parameter t.
Proof. The above protocol fills out the L matrix as in the Masek-Patterson algorithm after mn/t 2 invocations of the SPBR protocol. Naively, the protocol proceeds (row-by-row or column-by-column) in mn/t 2 rounds. In a straight-forward manner, we can parallelize many of these steps and improve this to m/t + n/t rounds. When we set N = 2 t , then the query returns the appropriate -bit entry of the bbf look-up table of size 2 t . When = t log t, the computational complexity of the protocol is O(2 2t * f ( N, ) * (2t + 2t log t)/ ) = O(t2 t ). The total communication complexity is O(mn/t 2 * g( N, ) * (2t + 2t log t)/ ) = O(mn/t).
Claim. Concretely, the assumptions of Theorems 2 and 3 are satisfied by the SPBR scheme attained by transforming the Gentry-Ramzan PBR scheme [21] to an SPBR scheme using either the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold or Naor-Pinkas transforms. The security of this SPBR scheme is based on the hardness of the "extended decision subgroup problem" and the assumptions required for the transform (e.g., secure homomorphic encryption for Aiello-Ishai-Reingold).
The proposed protocol establishes a useful framework for many dynamic programming algorithms, providing a range of efficiencies based on trading computational complexity for communication complexity. At one extreme, when t = 1, the communication and computational complexities resemble that of Yao's garbled circuit protocol. At the other extreme, when t = n, the costs match those of the communication preserving compiler of Naor and Nissim [30] , achieving O(m) communication complexity (matching the simple theoretic lower bound) but requiring work exponential in n. Between these extremes, the protocol yields a smooth trade-off between work and communication, achieving any sub-quadratic communication complexity at the expense of computational complexity.
Private Backtracking in Our Protocol
We have provided a protocol for determining the length of an LCS of A and B privately, although a natural remaining question is to ask is if we can recover the value of an LCS string itself (or the bit-string which encodes how an LCS is embedded in A and B) privately. We call this a private LCS-backtracking protocol.
Definition 2 (Private LCS-backtracking).
A private LCS-backtracking protocol between two parties is one in which (1) the parties hold private input strings A and B, (2) the protocol outputs an LCS (or, embedding of the LCS) for A and B, (3) there is some deterministic algorithm that agrees with the protocol's output for any valid input, (4) the protocol reveals no information to a passive adversary other than what she can learn from the output.
In fact, with some careful planning, we can modify our LCS-length protocol to build a LCS-backtracking protocol. Our LCS-backtracking protocol relies on no stronger assumptions than our LCS-length protocol, and its communication complexity and work are asymptotically no greater than that of our LCS-length protocol. The full details of this protocol are provided in Appendix A.
Related Applications
Our techniques can be viewed as a specialization of Naor-Nissim circuits with look-up tables [30] , for a class of dynamic programming problems that have the property that their subproblems can be "efficiently encoded." By this, we mean that the problem can be decomposed into overlapping subproblems of size t, each of which can be encoded using O(t) bits. For the LCS problem, it was essential that adjacent entries in L differed by at most 1, so each t × t block could be encoded with O(t) bits. If, however, adjacent entries differed by, say, an arbitrary value in [0, n], then any encoding of the subproblem would require O(t log n) bits; the size of the subproblem's look-up table would be strictly greater than O(2 t ), and the cost of iteratively accessing this table would result in no savings when compared to Yao's garbled circuit protocol.
There are natural applications that fall into this general framework of dynamic programming problems with "efficiently encoded" subproblems. We list some below, with remarks on how to solve each with our private protocols for LCS-length and LCS-backtracking, either immediately or with minor modifications.
Edit Distance
The private LCS-length protocol automatically yields a private algorithm recovering the edit distance (Levenshtein distance), because edit-distance(A, B) = m + n − 2 * LCS-length(A, B) This relationship holds because transforming A into B via a series of deletions and insertions is equivalent to deleting n − LCS-length characters, and inserting m − LCS-length characters.
Damerau-Levenshtein distance (where the allowable operations are insertions, deletions, substitutions, or transpositions) is not automatically implied by LCS-length, but it is clear that a small modification of our protocol will suffice. In particular, when pre-computing the t × t block at position (i, j) in L, in order to consider transposition operations we may need to refer back to data in row i − 1 and column j − 1. That is, the input to the basic block function will require 4t offset vectors (instead of 2t vectors), and the t × t blocks will tile the L matrix overlapping with a previous block in two rows or columns (instead of just one). Such a modification does not change the asymptotic complexity of the resultant protocol.
Ulam's metric is a type of similarity measure or distance metric for permutations, similar to Kendall's τ -metric or Spearman's rank correlation metric. For permutations π, π of order n, the Levenshtein distance of π and π is equivalent to the Ulam distance. Thus, our protocol gives two parties the ability to privately compute the Ulam similarity of their ordered preference lists of common elements. Note that this is somewhat different from the setting of Freedman et al. [20] , which performed a privacy-preserving set intersection to measure the similarity between unordered preference lists of different elements.
Shortest Common Supersequence
The private LCS-length protocol automatically yields a private algorithm recovering the length of the shortest common supersequence (SCS), because SCS-length(A, B) = m + n − LCS-length(A, B)
This relationship holds because the SCS is the shortest string containing A and B as subsequences, which can always be obtained by adding to an LCS the extra characters from A and B. However, when the number of strings is greater than 2, there is no longer a relationship between the problems [19] .
Other dynamic programming applications
The longest common substring (LCSS) problem and longest increasing subsequence (LIS) problem both have dynamic programming solutions with similar structure. Our protocol can be used directly or with slight modifications to solve these problems. For example, given the string A and an ordering on Σ, σ 1 < σ 2 < . . . < σ |Σ| , we have LIS(A) = LCS(A, B)
where
The LCSS problem can be solved by modifying the basic block function to utilize the recurrence
Both the LIS and LCSS problems, however, have more efficient nondynamic programming solutions: LIS can be solved in O(n log n) time with arrays and binary search; LCSS can be solved in O(n + m) time with suffix trees. While the circuits implementing these solutions are of size O(mn), it is likely that there are more efficient specialized two-party protocols implementing these solutions.
Private diff
The Unix command "diff A B" traditionally returns an annotated file showing the least-costly merge of file A and file B. From the annotations, both A and B can be recovered. Thus, a private implementation of diff has little utility, as the output leaks both inputs. It may be natural, however, to consider an asymmetric version of diff, where Alice does not learn an annotated file merging A and B but instead learns which parts of A have been removed, which parts have been preserved, and where insertions have been made (analogous to an embedding). Modifying LCSbacktracking to achieve this functionality is straight-forward. Similarly, it may be natural to consider calculating statistics related to the diff of two files, and not output the merged file itself. For example, the command diff A B | wc -1 returns the edit distance of files A and B and, as we have seen, is easily calculated using our LCS-length protocol.
A private diff protocol may be useful in the situation where Alice and Bob want to collaborate to determine if either one has "plagiarized" the other, without leaking their own proprietary data to the other participant who, necessarily, they suspect may be possible of plagiarism. A realistic scenario similar to this one is discovering GPL violations [33] ; the protocol may be a useful discovery mechanism, allowing Bob to inspect if Alice has violated the use restrictions of his software licensed under the GPL (by including it in her proprietary code without redistributing it under the GPL) while at the same time respecting the Alice's potentially noninfringing, proprietary code.
Multiparty variants of LCS-length and LCS-backtracing
Instead of running a protocol between two parties, it may be desirable to outsource the work to some fixed number of parties m, such that no passive adversary corrupting less than m participants can learn any information beyond the output, for privacy reasons. Alternatively, perhaps neither Alice nor Bob want to play the role of the server (who pre-computes the basic block function table) but instead want to leverage the resources of one or more external servers, without having to trust them. We can generalize our LCS-length and LCS-backtracking protocols to this scenario using a multiparty generalization of indirect indexing [17, 24] . In particular, the multiparty indirect indexing scheme of Ishai et al. [24] is a general construction using any 2-round OT protocol. To achieve a construction with polylogarithmic communication complexity, Ishai et al. use an OT scheme based on PIR with length-flexible messages (achieved using a length-flexible homomorphic encryption scheme such as Damgård-Jurik [15, 16] ). To achieve multiparty indirect indexing with a strictly logarithmic communication complexity, we can instead use Gentry-Ramzan. With a database of size N , the m-iterated use of Gentry-Ramzan generates messages of length O(log N c m ) = O(log N ) for a small constant c < 8 [29] . Thus, we can use the construction of Ishai et al., instantiated with an appropriate version of Gentry-Ramzan, to perform multiparty indirect indexing, and generalize our protocols to the multiparty scenario with no asymptotic increase to the costs.
Fixed m-string LCS
In the multiparty version of LCS-length and LCS-backtracking protocols, it is natural to consider the situation were each party i holds a string A i as her private input, and the m parties wish to compute the length (or embedding or string) of the LCS of the strings A 1 , . . . , A m . The following is a straight-forward generalization of the standard dynamic programming solution for this problem, using an m-dimensional L matrix. end if 7: end for As before, adjacent rows and columns never differ by more than 1, so the offset vectors can be efficiently encoded using bit-strings. Thus, the four Russians technique can still be used. We can generalize our protocols to simulate this algorithm in a similarly straight-forward fashion.
Conclusion
We have presented a private protocol for the longest common subsequence problem, a classic problem for both computer scientists and biologists.
While the "four Russians" technique traditionally offers only a logarithmic savings in work for the traditional dynamic programming algorithm for LCS, we use it to achieve a smooth trade-off between communication complexity and work, filling in the theoretical "terrain" between polynomial-work compilers (like Yao) and exponential-work compilers (like Naor-Nissim). Our protocol features an asymmetry in the work required from each participant, making it appealing in a client-server setting where it may be reasonable to believe there is an available server able to perform super-polynomial work to help compute on genomic data. Even when restricting all participants to polynomial resources, the result is a private protocol for the LCS problem achieving a sub-quadratic communication complexity: the first private LCS protocol whose efficiency improves on that of the generic solution using Yao's garbled circuit protocol. We have shown that the protocol and techniques extend (trivially, in some cases) to numerous other string algorithms useful for computing with genomic data. We anticipate this technique to be useful in achieving communication-efficient protocols for many other problems that have similarly-structured dynamic programming algorithms.
